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ABSTRACT
This paper reviews current discussions on
reforming the European Union (EU) budgetary
procedure and assesses the main reform
proposals that have been suggested thus far. It
argues that prospects for reforms are presently
hampered by the complex interplay between
supranational and intergovernmental decision
modes and the requirement of any budgetary
procedure to strike a balance between
efficiency and legitimacy. The paper reviews
the main criticisms of the present budgetary
procedure and the related reform proposals,
which are assessed on the basis of relevant
theoretical literature as well as brief
comparisons with the federal budget of the
United States. The paper argues that the current
EU budgetary procedure maximises efficiency
and legitimacy, given the present state of
political integration in the EU. Significant
modifications to the budgetary procedure
would depart from that equilibrium.5
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Calls for reform of the procedures governing
the finances of the EU have enjoyed some
prominence in recent discussions on the future
institutional framework of the EU. Both in
academic and policy-making circles, it has
become commonplace to refer to the “problem”
deriving from the present EU budgetary
framework at both the multi-annual and annual
levels. The Chairman of the European
Convention, President Giscard d’Estaing,
commented on the present budgetary procedure
by claiming that “there is indeed a real problem
in that area” (Plenary Session of the
Convention on 12 September 2002). The
representative of the United Kingdom in the
Convention, Peter Hain, was equally bold on
this issue and called upon his colleagues to
“simplify where we can”. The Sapir Report
prepared at the request of Commission
President Prodi calls upon Member States to
“refocus the EU budget” (Sapir 2003); while
the special report of the European Parliament
on the budgetary procedure stressed the “need
for reforming, updating and simplifying”
(European Parliament 2003).
These demands for an institutional overhaul of
the EU budgetary procedure contrast with the
results achieved in the recent round of
discussions on changes to the EU legal
framework, in particular in the context of the
European Convention and the
Intergovernmental Conference (IGC). While
the Constitutional Treaty for Europe (which
was adopted by the IGC on 17-18 June 2004 but
still needs to be ratified by the Member States)
introduces a few minor changes to the
budgetary procedure, many fundamental issues
have either not been raised or have rapidly
disappeared from the agenda.
The goal of this paper is threefold. It intends
– to provide an assessment of the EU
budgetary procedure based on theoretical
considerations and brief comparisons with
the budgetary procedure of the United
States;
– to present an overview of the various reform
proposals presently or recently under
discussion, assessing their potential
implications for the balance between
efficiency and legitimacy in the EU
budgetary procedure; and
– to suggest an explanation of the nature of
the reform discussions on the EU budgetary
procedure and their (limited) impact on the
outcome of the recent constitutional
negotiations within the EU.
Although due to its limited size the EU budget
does not bear major economic and fiscal
importance for the EU economies, a close
analysis of the rules and procedure that govern
budgetary decision-making at the EU level is
nevertheless of considerable interest for the
European Central Bank (ECB). First, in
identifying the factors that determine the shape
and the design of the budgetary procedure this
paper provides indications of why the EU
budget has remained limited in size compared
to the national budgets. The small size of the
EU budget and the requirement that it must
always be in balance or in surplus have clear
“Now that the European Council has decided to give us the mandate to simplify
the system, to make it more functional and visibly democratic, are we supposed to hold
onto all the procedures which history has laid down in succession,
or are there some which can we do away with?”
Giuliano Amato, Vice-President of the European Convention,
on budgetary decision-making in the EU (12 September 2002)6
ECB
Occasional Paper No. 27
April 2005
implications for the conduct of macroeconomic
policy in the euro area: it makes the
coordination of decentralised fiscal policies all
the more crucial. The dominance of national
budgets reflects the current state of the
integration process, but it is not necessarily a
steady state. Understanding why the EU budget
remains small in comparison to national
budgets, how it has developed over time and the
debate about its future development is
therefore of great interest to those who, like the
ECB, are involved in policy formulation with a
euro area-wide perspective. Second,
modifications to the EU budgetary procedure
are a particularly intriguing example of
institutional reform in the EU. The reform
discussions concerning the EU budgetary
procedure reveal that individual policy areas
are embedded in the overall state of political
integration and that this embeddedness can
significantly constrain the scope of
institutional reform. The assessment of the
reform discussions and their outcome therefore
contributes to a better understanding of the
impediments to launching area-specific
reforms.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2
outlines the main theoretical considerations.
Section 3 presents the main criticisms of the
current EU budgetary procedure and reform
proposals and assesses them on the basis of
comparisons with the budgetary process in the
United States and with reference to the relevant
theoretical literature. Section 4 reviews the
actual changes contained in the European
Constitution and Section 5 concludes.
2 SOME THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
The assessment of the EU budgetary procedure
has to be placed into two sets of wider
theoretical analyses. On one hand, focusing on
the particular political and institutional context
of the EU, which is based on the pooling of
national sovereignties in a supranational
framework, seems warranted in order to
understand the implications of that particular
context for the budgetary procedure. On the
other hand, an overview of the theoretical
literature is necessary for identifying the
main features that should be provided by any
budgetary procedure.
Three main concepts are used to assess the
current EU budgetary procedure: efficiency,
legitimacy and political integration. These will
be considered in more detail later in this
section, but it is worth mentioning them briefly
at this point. We consider that any budgetary
procedure has to strike a balance between the
considerations of efficiency and legitimacy
under the constraint of political integration.
The efficiency of a budgetary procedure can be
described as the timely and flexible allocation
of resources in order to ensure the appropriate
provision of the main public goods required.
The legitimacy of a budgetary procedure
derives from the degree of democratic control
by citizens so that resources are allocated
according to the will of the people and that any
kind of “rent-seeking” is minimised. It follows
that from a purely institutional perspective
there is a conflict between the basic
requirements of efficiency and legitimacy,
with large units enhancing the former and small
units the latter (Scharpf 1988). We believe,
however, that beyond that simple institutional
relationship, the compatibility of efficiency
and legitimacy is largely conditioned by a
political dimension related to the willingness
of citizens to accept the redistributive
implications of a common budgetary authority.
The legitimacy of a large budgetary unit (e.g. in
a large nation state) increases in line with the
citizens’ sense of belonging to that unit, and
thus their willingness to be part of a pooled
system of income redistribution also grows.
We use the term “political integration” to refer
to this willingness. 1
1 This definition of political integration obviously relates to the
two large bodies of literature on fiscal federalism (see Oates
1999 for an overview) and on the appropriate size of nations
(see Alesina and Spolaore 1997).7
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2 However, it is also argued that efficient decision-making
procedures yielding effective policy outcomes can also create
a high degree of legitimacy (see the distinction between input
and output legitimacy in Scharpf 1999).
THE EU’S INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
BETWEEN SUPRANATIONAL AND
INTERGOVERNMENTAL DECISION MODES
The origins of the EU’s present institutional
set-up can be assessed in terms of a principal-
agent analogy. This starting point benefits from
the use of constitutional choice literature (e.g.
Buchanan/Tullock 1962) which gives
normative and positive accounts of the origins
of constitutional orders and their legitimacy
and efficiency. The focal point of the
constitutional choice literature is the pooling
of individual citizens’ sovereignty and the
delegating of functions and powers to elected
representatives. Citizens, as principals, allow
elected representatives, as their agents, to be in
charge of public institutions and to take
political decisions.
While the principal-agent analogy allows the
constitutional choice literature to explain the
rationale behind the existence of states, the
analogy can also be used to analyse institution
building at the international level and, in the
specific European context, at the supranational
level (Pollack 2003). Here, states are regarded
as the principals. Under certain circumstances,
cooperation among states is beneficial and
states may decide to pool their political
sovereignty in selected areas. A key example of
such an institution based on a certain degree of
pooling of sovereignty among states is the
United Nations (UN). Other examples include
the UN specialist bodies such as the
International Monetary Fund and the World
Trade Organisation.
In the context of pooled sovereignties at the
supranational level, there are, however, two
types of decision-making procedure:
– Intergovernmental cooperation. States
agree to take decisions in the relevant
policy area by unanimity, thus preserving a
considerable degree of “ultimate”
sovereignty stemming from the power of
each individual member state to veto
decisions. These decisions are legitimised
by the direct link between citizens and their
national governments and the fact that these
governments cannot be outvoted. At the
same time, the unanimity rule renders
negotiations difficult, as decision-making
is clearly hampered by national vetoes.
– Supranational governance. States might
realise that it is beneficial to take some
decisions by majority and to delegate, as
principals, certain functions to an
(independent) agent helping them to
overcome collective action problems. This
move towards majority voting and
delegation is motivated by an interest in
increasing the efficiency of international
decision-making. The states sacrifice
their veto power and assign political tasks,
such as overseeing implementation and
mediating between states, to a supranational
agent. However, supranational governance
may, in the view of citizens, be regarded as
less legitimate, because national
governments can be outvoted and
supranational agents exercise power
without a direct mandate from the citizens.2
In order to counteract this lack of direct
legitimisation, supranational actors may be
directly elected by the citizens, thus
circumventing national governments as the
sole source of legitimacy. However, this
increase in legitimacy may again come at
the cost of efficiency. The involvement of
an additional directly elected agent may
increase the complexity of decision-
making.
Applying these theoretical considerations to
the EU, we can see a political system that has
reached an advanced but still limited state of
integration. Important areas of national
sovereignty, such as competition and trade
policy and the four freedoms that underpin the
single market, are pooled at the EU level and a
certain degree of political identification and8
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acceptance has been achieved. However, the
nation state still provides an important
reference point for political identity and
national institutions continue to determine the
day-to-day life of citizens in a vast number of
areas.
With regard to the institutional set-up, the EU
level is governed by a combination of
supranational and intergovernmental forms of
decision-making. In the intergovernmental
sphere, Heads of State or Government set the
broad policy guidelines in the European
Council by consensus. Moreover, they adopt
Treaty changes, which are subsequently
ratified according to national domestic
procedures. In the Council of Ministers,
representatives of national governments make
detailed policy decisions on the basis of
legislative initiatives from the supranational
Commission. Voting rules vary depending on
the policy field. Where unanimous voting still
applies, the Council acts as an
intergovernmental body, while in the case of
qualified majority voting ministers switch to
supranational mode. The directly elected
European Parliament provides a link between
the supranational decision-making process and
the citizens. Its involvement as a strong veto-
player is largely connected to qualified
majority voting in the Council, where, in terms
of legitimacy, it compensates for the loss of
Member States’ veto power. Moreover, it
fulfils control functions vis-à-vis the
Commission and thus contributes to an
appropriate level of accountability. The
present institutional set-up of the EU thus
combines elements of intergovernmental
cooperation and supranational governance and
strikes a balance between legitimacy and
efficiency.
This overall balance lays the foundation for the
specific rules and procedures in the different
policy fields of the EU. The involvement of the
Commission, the European Parliament and the
Council is a common feature of most policy
domains. It caters for similar legitimacy and
efficiency concerns regardless of the particular
characteristics of the specific policy field. This
does not mean that there is no variation in the
degree to which political authority is delegated
to supranational agents in the different
domains. Indeed, in certain policy fields, such
as competition policy, the Commission
exercises significant decision-making powers,
while in others, such as the Common Foreign
and Security Policy, decisions are taken by
unanimity in the Council. However, policy
fields evolve as part of the overall institutional
framework. Moreover, they reflect the general
scope of pooled sovereignty and the degree of
political integration and acceptance.
Therefore, calls to reform the decision-making
procedure in a particular policy field should not
be assessed independently of the general state
of integration. On the contrary, their contents
should be put under scrutiny with a view to the
“meta-level” that the state of integration
constitutes. This meta-level not only
overarches but also determines decision-
making in the different policy fields of the EU.
Therefore the complexity or alleged
inefficiency of a decision-making procedure
cannot be exclusively attributed to the
institutional provisions governing the specific
policy field but need to be linked to the
characteristics of the meta-level. Moreover,
the degree of embeddedness in the meta-level
constrains the scope of institutional reform in a
policy field. In other words, while far-reaching
reform proposals could increase the efficiency
and legitimacy of the procedure, they would
indeed require a higher degree of political
integration than is currently the case.
BUDGETARY PROCEDURES – A BALANCE
BETWEEN EFFICIENCY AND LEGITIMACY
Shifting the analysis from the general
reflections on the institutional set-up of the EU
to the procedural features of the budgetary
field, it becomes clear that the complex
interplay between the concerns of legitimacy
and efficiency is even further accentuated in
that particular area. Decisions on the9
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CONSIDERATIONS utilisation of public finances need to be
subjected to tight control by citizens so that
resources are allocated according to the will of
the people and any kind of rent-seeking is
minimised. At the same time, such decisions
need to ensure an efficient resource allocation
and ought to guarantee the provision of the
main public goods required.
There is a solid body of academic literature
linking these fundamental requirements of a
budgetary procedure to the underlying
institutional framework.
In relation to the effectiveness and efficiency
of the budgetary procedure, influential
literature has emerged from a number of cross-
country analyses comparing different types of
institutional framework. Mainly developed by
von Hagen (1992), von Hagen and Harden
(1994), and Hallerberg and von Hagen (1999),
this literature establishes theoretically
grounded and empirically detectable links
between institutional components of the
budgetary procedure and its success in
achieving specific policy goals (in this
literature mainly fiscal discipline). The
starting point for these analyses is the
assumption that an optimal allocation of public
resources is unlikely to be achieved within a
complex interplay of numerous actors pursuing
different interests. They show that a strong
political authority at the top of the process (e.g.
a strong finance minister), a parliament with
limited amending powers, and a strict
implementation process ensure a lower overall
size of the budget and more restricted use of
debt as a way of financing public expenditure.
What stems from this literature is the claim that
budgetary procedures need to be capable of
yielding swift and effective decisions on fiscal
measures, even if such measures seem
unpopular in the short run.
The delegation of powers to a strong political
authority for efficiency reasons, however,
needs to be embedded in an effective
democratic control mechanism, ensuring that
voters’ legitimacy concerns are met. As a
number of stylised analyses in political
economy convincingly demonstrate, for voter
utility to be maximised in a system of delegated
authority, an effective separation of powers
needs to be enacted (Persson, Roland and
Tabellini 1997; Persson and Tabellini 2003).
The analyses are based on the key distinction
between presidential and parliamentary
constitutional regimes, arguing that direct
accountability is more effective in presidential
than in parliamentary democracies. Persson,
Roland and Tabellini (1997, 2000) give two
reasons for this. First, the chain of delegation is
shorter under the presidential system, since the
executive is directly accountable to the voters.
In a parliamentary system, where the executive
is directly accountable not to the voters but to
the legislature, the scope for collusion at the
voters’ expense is greater. Second, the degree
of separation of powers tends to be larger and
the system of checks and balances tends to
function more effectively in presidential
systems. Persson, Roland, and Tabellini
generally argue that checks and balances in a
presidential system improve accountability
and strengthen the incentives for good
behaviour among politicians, since voters can
exploit diverging interests among the bodies
involved in decision-making to prevent abuse
of power or to reduce information asymmetries
between themselves and the policymakers (see
also Persson and Tabellini 2003).
THE EU BUDGETARY PROCEDURE AND
THE CONSTRAINT OF LIMITED POLITICAL
INTEGRATION
Looking at the EU budgetary procedure from
the twin perspectives of “efficiency” and
“legitimacy”, it becomes clear that the
institutional complexities arising from the
articulation of supranational and
intergovernmental decision modes are even
greater in the budgetary sphere. While it is
straightforward to argue that an appropriate
budgetary procedure for the EU would seek to
strike a balance between citizens’ legitimacy
concerns and procedural efficiency concerns, it10
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has to be taken into account that such balance
has to be determined under the constraint of
still limited political integration. Indeed, as a
large number of studies and surveys indicate
(see overview in Marx and Hooghe 2003), the
delegation of sovereignty from European
citizens to the EU is to a large extent still
grounded in a strong national identity rather
than a European identity. The mechanism of
democratic control by European citizens of
decision-making bodies of the EU still seems
largely perceived as requiring the intervention
of national governments rather than being
exercised directly through the European
Parliament.
In this context, options for reforms of the
budgetary procedure need to be considered
within the scope granted by the present degree
of political integration. The EU budget
basically reflects the range of those areas in
which sovereignty is pooled at the EU level.
Such pooling is often legitimised on the basis
of efficiency. However, taking into account the
varying degree of European citizens’ political
identification with supranational decision-
making at the EU level and also the very
tangible financial component of budgetary
decisions, possible legitimacy concerns need
to be carefully addressed. The involvement of
Member States’ representatives serves to
redress such concerns, as budgetary decisions
are usually regarded as an issue close to
national sovereignty. However, such
intergovernmental elements may come at the
expense of efficiency.
This paper thus argues that the exogenously
given state of political integration is key to
understanding the current debate – and its
outcome – on the reform of the EU budgetary
procedure. Proponents of far-reaching reforms
seem to underestimate, first, the scope for
change allowed by the general state of
integration and, second, the high degree to
which the current procedure is already in tune
with the present degree of integration.
To illustrate this assessment, Figure 1 (which
should be viewed as a metaphorical depiction
rather than a formula-based curve) indicates
possible solutions to the identified trade-off
between legitimacy and efficiency. These
solutions are limited by a “Pareto frontier”
determined by the state of integration – i.e.
outward/inward shifts of the frontier can only
be triggered by increases/decreases in political
integration.
Proponents of reform seem to assume that the
budgetary procedure is currently situated at the
suboptimal point A. This paper, by contrast,
argues that point B is probably an accurate
description of the current procedure. While the
proponents of reform take the view that reforms
would significantly and simultaneously
increase efficiency and legitimacy, this paper
argues that improvements could only be
marginal and would have to concentrate on
enhancing either efficiency (leading to B’) or
legitimacy (leading to B”).
3 REFORMING THE EU BUDGETARY
PROCEDURE: AN ASSESSMENT
This section assesses the main proposals for
reform of the EU budgetary procedure and
argues that simultaneous increases in
legitimacy and efficiency are highly unlikely11
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European on the budgetary Sapir European
Reform proposals Parliament1) procedure2) Group3) Convention4)
Content of the budget
a) Re-focussing the expenditure side of the EU budget – – Yes –
b) Modifying the revenue base of the EU budget Yes – Yes –
Financial Perspective
a) Adopting the Financial Perspective and/or the revenue Yes Yes (preferably Yes Yes for the
side by qualified majority among Member States with a “super FP, but no for
majority”) later revenue
b) Institutionalising the Financial Perspective Yes Yes – Yes
c) Adopting the Financial Perspective in the Council – No – Yes 6)
of Ministers instead of the European Council
d) Taking the veto power from the European Parliament No No – No
e) Shortening the time frame of the Financial Perspective Yes No (at least – No (at least
and synchronising it with the European Parliament elections five years) five years)




a) Eliminating the distinction between compulsory Yes Yes – Yes
and non-compulsory expenditure
b) Giving either the Council or the European Parliament Yes (EP 5)) Yes (EP 5)) – Yes (EP 5))
the last word
Table 1 Overview of reform proposals
1) European Parliament (2003): Report on the reform of the budgetary procedure: possible options in view of the revision of the
treaties, 20 February, A5-0046/2003.
2) European Convention (2003a): Final report of the discussion circle on the budgetary procedure, 14 April, CONV 679/03.
3) André Sapir et al. (2003): An Agenda for a Growing Europe. Making the EU Economic System Deliver, July.
4) European Convention (2003b): Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, 18 July, CONV 820/1/03 REV 1, CONV 847/
03, CONV 848/03.
5) Within certain limitations.
6) But possibly allowing for the Council of Ministers to meet at the level of the Heads of State or Government.
3 The description of the US budgetary process is based on the
seminal treatment of the matter by Schick (2000), as well as
Office of Management and the Budget (2003) and
Congressional Budget Office (2003). For the EU budgetary
procedure, Laffan (1997), Nava (2000), European Commission
(2002) and Lindner (2005) serve as the main references.
without major advances in political
integration.
In the current political discussions an array of
different reform proposals have been presented
by various actors. The European Parliament set
out its ideas in a report that was initiated by the
Committee on Budgets (European Parliament
2003). The European Convention focused
extensively on the budgetary procedure in a
special discussion circle (European
Convention 2003a) during the preparatory
phase leading to the issue of its draft Treaty
establishing a Constitution in June 2003
(European Constitution 2003b). Finally, an
independent, high-level study group, which
was established at the initiative of the
President of the Commission, also covered the
budgetary procedure in its report on the
economic governance of the EU (Sapir et al.
2003). Table 1 gives an overview of these
different proposals.
These reform proposals can be assessed in the
context of a comparison of the EU budgetary
procedure with the decision-making process of
the US federal budget.3 Obviously, comparing
the United States and the EU is limited in its
legitimacy. The United States is already a
fully-fledged federal system where
“intergovernmental” cooperation has made
way for “supranational” governance and states12
ECB
Occasional Paper No. 27
April 2005
EU budget US federal budget
Total expenditure Total expenditure
amount EUR 99.7 billion amount USD 2,158 billion
as a percentage of GNI 1.0% as a percentage of GDP 19.8%
Selected expenditure Selected expenditure
as a percentage of total as a percentage of total
expenditure in 2003 expenditure in 2003
Agricultural policy and rural 45% Social security 22%
development
Structural and Cohesion Funds 34% Health (including Medicare) 22%
Internal policies 7% National defence 19%
External actions 5% Income security (e.g., unemployment benefits) 15%
Pre-accession aid 3% Education 4%
Table 2 The content of the EU and US budgets in 2003
Sources: European Union Financial Report 2003 and Office of Management and Budget.
have pooled much of their sovereignty, as is
also reflected in the actual contents of the
federal budget (see Table 2). In the United
States, political decision-making takes place in
a context of dominant federal actors. The
executive power enshrined in the Presidency
largely depends on agreements with the House
of Representatives, representing the interests
of electoral districts, and the Senate,
representing those of individual states.
Imposing an analogy with the EU, the role of
the European Commission can be compared
with that of the US President, the role of the
European Parliament with that of the House of
Representatives and the role of the Council of
Ministers with that of the Senate. From this
analogy one clear difference between the
broader political systems of the United States
and the EU becomes immediately apparent: the
degree of representation of the citizens. In the
United States, Senators are directly elected by
their constituents, rather than being
representatives of state governments.
Similarly, although the President of the United
States and the European Commission could be
characterised as the executive power
respectively in the two systems, there is a clear
difference in terms of how they are appointed.
In other words, there is a direct link between
the electorate and all three players in the US
budgetary process, which is further enhanced
by a national identity that attaches US citizens
to the federal level. In terms of the criteria
outlined above, this difference matters most in
checks and balances but also plays a role when
it comes to effectiveness of decision-making
and to transparency. This brief and broad-brush
comparison between EU and US procedures is
nonetheless a worthwhile exercise as it
illustrates areas for possible reform of the EU
procedure, while also showing that even the
fully integrated political system of the United
States still functions on the basis of a budgetary
procedure based on a complex interplay
between legitimacy and efficiency concerns
within a multi-level polity.
PROPOSALS FOR REFORM AT THE
GENERAL LEVEL
One main criticism voiced with regard to the
general level of the EU budget relates to the
expenditure structure of the EU budget and
implicitly also raises the issue of the size of the
EU budget.
In this context, it should be noted that at present
the size of the EU budget is almost negligible in
economic terms (around 1% of EU GNI),4
whereas the US budget amounts to roughly one
third of US GDP, of which the federal level
accounts for approximately twice as much as
4 At present the size of the EU budget is formally capped at
1.24% of combined national GNIs.13
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expenditure by the states. The large difference
in size between the EU and US budgets reflects
the very different compositions of the
respective expenditures and sources of
revenue. While in the United States the federal
budget contributes to the financing of state and
local government through annual federal grants
amounting to around 3.5% of GDP, the
relationship in the EU is the opposite.
Moreover, large parts of the US budget are
concentrated on welfare, military spending,
education and servicing federal debt. In
contrast, in the EU spending on welfare,
defence and education is done at the national
level. The EU budget focuses mainly on a small
number of policies with a strong redistributive
bent, namely agricultural and regional policies,
which alone account for more than 80% of
expenditure in the EU budget. While
agricultural spending provides European
farmers with subsidies, regional spending
redistributes funds to less wealthy regions.
Although often presented as such (e.g.
Leonardi 1999), these policies may only to a
limited extend be regarded as public goods
benefiting the Union as a whole. Together with
a revenue side that de facto is based largely on
national contributions, these policies result in a
system in which Member States are under
pressure to demand “juste retour” for the
payments into the budget.
The present EU budget is expenditure-led
within a limit set in an “Interinstitutional
Agreement” with a multi-annual horizon (see
below). Resources are raised to match what is
needed to carry out the EU policies. This
creates very different incentives for the
European Parliament and the Council as the
two arms of the budgetary authority. For
Member States there is an incentive to reduce
expenditure to achieve a reduction in their
direct contributions, while for the European
Parliament there is an incentive to propose
expenditure programmes, since the matching
financing will be furnished automatically by
the Member States up to the overall ceiling.
Members of the European Parliament (MEPs)
thus enjoy a unique position – they gain credit
for expenditure agreed by the European
Parliament, but are not associated with the
related costs. This is not the case for US
politicians, who also set the tax levels
necessary to finance expenditure. In practice,
however, differences in the incentives for
Member States and MEPs have been reduced,
on one hand, by a growing acceptance among
MEPs of an austerity approach towards
budgetary decisions and, on the other hand, by
the interests of individual Member States in
expenditure in areas in which they gain more
from the budget than they contribute.
While one of the main rationales for the
existence of a public budget is the financing of
the provision of public goods which would
otherwise be under-provided, the fact that
current expenditure at the EU level is for the
most part redistributive in nature shows that
equity rather than efficiency criteria play a
dominant role in guiding the expenditure side
of the EU budget. Although it does not question
the existence of a redistributive element in the
budget, the Sapir report favours a “change in
the current mix of equity and efficiency
considerations” when deciding upon
expenditure financed by the EU budget as well
as an increase in the provision of public goods,
which do not prompt a calculation of juste
retour among contributors. The Sapir report
suggests that the EU budget should promote
growth through expenditure on R&D,
education and training, and infrastructure.
Other proposals have included internal and
external security, foreign policy, research,
immigration, and single market-related issues
(see e.g. Tabellini 2002).
The key problem related to changes on the
expenditure side is obviously one of allocating
more legitimacy for decision-making at the
European level. It has to be borne in mind that
the present structure of EU expenditure reflects
the current institutional set-up of the EU and14
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5 As Padoa-Schioppa (2002: 200) puts it: “There can be no
doubt that it would be a good thing, for the Union, to have more
room for manoeuvre in the area of budgetary policy. But it is
also my belief that this can only come as a natural consequence
of political union. No country has ever adopted a large budget
just in an effort to obtain more instruments for economic
policy. Historically, the size of the budgets grew because the
functions attributed to the Union grew.”
6 In a sense, the situation with regard to the EU budget
resembles more closely the one that characterised the US
federal budget during the nineteenth century. In fact, up until
1921 the budgetary process in the United States can be
characterised as one of legislative dominance (Schick, 2000),
in which the Congress effectively constrained the executive
not only over total expenditure but also over individual items
of expenditure (see description of the EU budgetary procedure
below). The size of the US federal budget was very limited and
stable at around 2% of GDP up until the Civil War in the 1860s,
and mainly devoted to financing public works projects,
defence and the operations of government agencies. In
addition, in the absence of a federal income tax, the US budget
lacked true own resources to commit itself to making major
investments in transportation and finance. The major source
of US federal revenues throughout the nineteenth century
remained the tariff, which accounted for around 80 to 90% of
federal revenues (Wallis 2000). Moreover, and despite the
lack of a formal constraint on budgetary outcomes, the norm
of balanced budgets was broadly maintained. It was not until
the 1930s that the US federal budget gained the prominence
that it currently enjoys in the allocation of fiscal activity
between the different levels of government.
the political consensus on the policy tasks
assigned to the EU and national levels
respectively.5
Any changes to be made on the expenditure
side of the EU budget would thus necessitate an
agreement among policymakers on the
modification of the present assignment of
policy tasks at the EU level. Reforms of the
spending programmes depend on the
willingness of citizens to allocate additional
tasks to the EU and thus may only be realised as
a consequence of changes in the degree of
political integration (see also Strauss-Kahn et
al. 2004).
A related field of criticism with regard to the
present general features of the EU budget is its
revenue base.  At present, the EU is funded
predominantly by direct transfers from the
Members States, although the current system is
called a system of “own resources”. Direct
transfers obviously facilitate the computation
of net positions and do little to curb Member
States’ pursuit of juste retour.
The system of own resources has become less
and less autonomous since its creation in the
1970s when it was intended to give resources to
the Community that would “belong” to it and
would not depend on decisions by national
governments. This, together with the granting
of the “power of the purse” to the European
Parliament in the 1970s, was a development of
a federal nature, aimed at enhancing the
supranational element of the Community.
However, as Community expenditure
increased, the traditional own resources,
namely customs duties, agricultural levies and
VAT contributions, proved insufficient and a
fourth resource – in form of a set percentage of
national GNP – was established as part of the
Delors-I package in 1988 which also
introduced the multi-annual Financial
Perspective (see below). This fourth resource,
which now accounts for approximately two-
thirds of total EU budget revenues, can be
regarded as similar to the pre-1970 period in
which the Community was financed by
contributions from the Member States (Begg
and Grimwade 1998). In line with the notion of
an expenditure-led budget and in consideration
of the sovereignty concerns of Member States,
changes in the revenue structure of the EU have
to be taken by unanimity following a procedure
that is completely separate from the annual
budgetary procedure.
In the United States around one-half of current
revenues are raised by personal income tax, a
third by social insurance receipts and a further
10% by corporate income tax. Almost all of
these sources of income are referred to in the
US federal budget as general funds. Decisions
over the level and structure of taxes are often
directly linked with expenditure decisions. The
US budget is allowed to run deficits, but, in line
with the current state of integration, the Treaty
clearly forecloses this option in the EU and
obliges the budgetary authority to adopt
balanced budgets.6
In the light of the decreasingly autonomous
character of the EU’s “own resources”, a15
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7 While the Financial Perspective sets an upper limit on the
annual EU budget, there is some limited leeway for revisions
in response to unforeseen circumstances. However, any
revision has to remain within the margin for unforeseen
expenditure as specified in the Financial Perspective.
Moreover, revisions amounting to more than 0.03% of
Community GNI require the agreement of both the European
Parliament and the Council, whereby the Council has to act
unanimously (in the case of revisions below 0.03% of
Community GNI, the Council can act by qualified majority).
number of proposals have been made. For
example, the Sapir report proposes the
introduction of a new revenue source with a
clear EU dimension, such as a tax with a very
mobile tax base within the EU. This could be
capital income taxes or stock exchanges taxes.
While such a tax would arguably convey a
strong and positive symbolic message and
enhance the transparency of citizens’
contributions to the EU, it is doubtful that such
a proposal would be acceptable given the
present state of political integration. On one
hand, Member States seem very reluctant to
move the current set-up on the revenue side in a
more supranational direction which would
ultimately give the EU resources that cannot be
redirected to Member States when they exceed
the level of expenditure. On the other hand, the
creation of an “EU tax” would certainly require
a well-functioning system of checks and
balances at the EU level. As Persson, Roland
and Tabellini (1997) and Persson and Tabellini
(2003) argue, rents from power and incomplete
information at the expense of voters are
accentuated in a common pool situation in
which the bodies participating in the budgetary
procedure are “residual claimants” over the
budget (i.e. they can keep the benefits of
spending within the majority, putting part of
the costs on the excluded minority). Put in the
context of the EU institutional set-up, this
argument is certainly far too simple. There are
no clear lines of divide between majorities and
minorities in the EU context. Alliances tend to
vary greatly between different groups of actors
in both the European Parliament and the
Council. The fundamental demand of “no
taxation without representation” is still likely
to be voiced as an argument against an EU tax.
This argument would be technically wrong,
since representation could be ensured by the
European Parliament, but in the perception of
most EU citizens the time does not seem ripe
for introducing an EU tax.
Overall, looking at general aspects of the
budgets in the United States and the EU, it is
evident that the role of the EU budget is
commensurate with the much lower degree of
political integration in the EU: the size of the
budget is small, its content is not geared towards
the provision of basic public goods but has a very
limited focus and it is redistributive. This
combination of a budget which is funded by
direct transfers from Member States and which is
spent largely on regional or agricultural
programmes, which are easily tracked to
regional or national recipients, rather than on
European-wide public goods creates a situation
particularly prone to bargaining.
PROPOSALS FOR REFORM AT THE LEVEL OF
MULTI-ANNUAL PLANNING
The Financial Perspective is the EU’s multi-
annual budgetary framework (7 years) which
lays down the maximum amounts of both total
annual expenditure and annual expenditure in
specific policy areas.7
The Financial Perspective was a welcome
development when it was first introduced in
1988 (Lindner 2003). In the late 1970s and
early 1980s EU budgetary negotiations was
characterised by confrontations between the
European Parliament and the Council which
eventually led to the rejection of entire draft
budgets by the European Parliament (Läufer
1990). The early 1980s also saw complaints
from the United Kingdom and a lack of
sufficient resources. The latter was prompted
mainly by the increase in Common Agriculture
Policy (CAP) spending and aggravated when
the UK rebate was agreed. In this context, the
Financial Perspective was intended to
significantly restrict the scope for political
choice during the annual budgetary procedure.
By linking revenue and expenditure sides, it16
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8 Renegotiations in the European Council take place in
conjunction with other political issues. Hence, bargaining
among Member States combines budgetary issues with non-
budgetary issues. In this context, it has been argued that the
EU budget fulfils an important “compensation function”. It
compensates those Member States that might incur costs from
the integration process and thus, facilitates a consensus for
further integration among Member States (Folkers 1997).
9 Although the Commission and the European Parliament have,
as signatories of the International Agreement, a veto power
over the ceilings of the Financial Perspective, they rarely
exercise it. Usually, the European Parliament grants its
consent to the ceilings in exchange for informal extensions of
its budgetary powers.
ensured that expenditure-led budgets would no
longer exceed existing resources (Shackleton
1990).
The Financial Perspective combines
intergovernmental and supranational elements.
After a proposal by the Commission, it is
discussed in the European Council, where it
requires unanimous agreement among Member
States. The involvement of Heads of State or
Government ensures that differences and
stalemates between EU ministers are
overcome. The Financial Perspective is finally
adopted as an “Interinstitutional Agreement”
between the European Parliament, the Council
and the Commission. In contrast to indicative
financial programming, the ceilings of the
Financial Perspective are binding on the three
parties. While the revenue ceilings are codified
in legal acts adopted unanimously by Member
States in the Council, the expenditure ceilings
gain their binding character from the political
willingness of actors to adhere to the
“Interinstitutional Agreement”, which by itself
does not have the status of an enforceable legal
act (Monar 1994). The semi-voluntary
character of the Financial Perspective obliges
actors to cooperate, as the multi-annual
framework would otherwise break down.
Planning stability and a reduction in conflict
comes at a price: the Financial Perspective
clearly limits the flexibility of budgetary actors
and introduces a strong status-quo bias. Annual
expenditure ceilings for regional spending, for
example, have the status of spending targets
and thus commit annual budgetary decisions
over a period of seven years. Moreover, when
the Financial Perspective is renegotiated in the
European Council, national governments use
their veto power in order to maximise
budgetary gains. Although the Financial
Perspective is not automatically renewed at the
end of the seven year period, the use of veto
power and the resulting bargaining dynamics
lead to a largely incremental revision of the
ceilings, thus respecting the key spending
interests of Member States, such as the rebate
for the United Kingdom, regional spending for
the countries benefiting from the Cohesion
Fund, and unaltered CAP spending.8 In such a
setting, major changes and far-reaching
reforms are very unlikely to occur (Begg 1999)
unless there is significant progress in political
integration.9
In the United States there is no true multi-
annual planning, as there are no binding multi-
annual constraints. The President’s budget,
which is transmitted to Congress each
February, pertains exclusively to the following
fiscal year, while the horizon envisaged in the
congressional budget resolution has no
statutory implications. The only multi-annual
budgetary implications stem from the
mandatory spending implied by past acts
providing for entitlements such as social
security, but then again, the President and
Congress can change the law in order to change
the spending on entitlements and other
mandatory programmes in any given year.
Overall, in the EU a binding multi-annual
budget plan adopted by Heads of State or
Government plays a key role in reducing the
conflict between budgetary actors and ensuring
planning stability. This comes at a price: the
flexibility of the annual procedure is seriously
curtailed and major shifts between the main
spending blocs are de facto almost impossible.
The intergovernmental level, at which
legitimacy concerns clearly dominate over
efficiency concerns, thus uses multi-annual
planning to strictly limit the scope for
supranational decision-taking in the annual
procedure. Although lengthening the
budgetary cycle is discussed, decision-making17
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10 Legitimacy concerns could to some extent be diminished by
involving the European Parliament in the decision-making
procedure on the revenue side.
in the United States proceeds almost
exclusively within the remit of the annual
procedure.
A number of proposals have been made to
reform the Financial Perspective.
One set of proposals for reform relates to the
suggestion of the European Parliament, the
Convention’s discussion circle on the
budgetary procedure and the Sapir report that
the Financial Perspective be adopted by
qualified majority voting among Member
States.
Such reform would address the key bottleneck of
the veto power by Member States. It would
probably reduce the tendency for the
negotiations on a new Financial Perspective by-
and-large to confirm the existing spending
structure. It may also help to curtail the
inclusion in the Financial Perspective of
amounts earmarked for specific spending
projects in individual Member States without a
direct link to existing expenditure programmes,
as has arguably been the case with the
expenditure for “particular situations” detailing
specific amounts of structural funds for certain
regions (Begg 1999). Combined with the
introduction of qualified majority voting on the
revenue side, this may enable Member States to
revisit the rules that govern own resources.
While these arguments may look very
appealing from the perspective of increasing
the efficiency of the EU budgetary procedure, it
is rather doubtful, given the present state of
political integration, that such reform would
indeed yield the desired increases in efficiency.
Moreover, it probably lacks the necessary basis
in terms of transfers of legitimacy.
It is indeed not certain that an abolition of the
unanimity requirements would eradicate the
“pork-barrel” character of the Financial
Perspective. Experience from areas in which
qualified majority voting has been adopted
show that bargaining still figures prominently
in the discussions, as Member States generally
try not to outvote each other.
Even more importantly, as the decisions
regarding the Financial Perspective and the
revenue side are ultimately redistributive in
nature (Member States will probably always try
to work out whether they are net contributors or
net recipients), it could be difficult to
legitimise the contributions to the EU budget of
Member States that are outvoted in the decision
on the Financial Perspective (imagine, for
example, a decision taken by majority that
significantly increases the budget contribution
of one of the large net contributors).10 The
unanimity requirement in the area of the
Financial Perspective and in particular on
the revenue side serves, at the moment, as
an important element in addressing the
sovereignty concerns of Member States.
Although, at first glance, the introduction of
qualified majority voting seems conducive to
further reducing conflict by limiting the veto
power of Member States, it might actually have
the opposite effect. Currently, Member States
are assured that their distributive interests will
be taken into account in the negotiations for the
renewal of the Financial Perspective. Potential
conflict is channelled into these negotiations.
If this were no longer the case, outvoted
Member States may altogether question the
advantage of having a Financial Perspective
and may carry their discontent into the annual
procedure. As long as the binding nature of the
Financial Perspective is dependent on the
political will and acceptance of all actors
involved, the introduction of qualified majority
voting might seriously threaten the functioning
of the Financial Perspective.
A second set of proposals for reform relates to
including the Financial Perspective in the
Treaty and making its ceiling legally binding,18
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as proposed by the European Parliament and
the Convention’s discussion circle. Budgetary
actors would be obliged to adopt a multi-annual
budget plan and to adhere to its ceilings
during the annual budgetary procedure. Such
an institutionalisation of the Financial
Perspective would give recognition to the
special relevance of the Financial Perspective
for budgetary decision-making and would thus
close the gap between the Treaty provisions
and current practices.
At the same time, depriving the Financial
Perspective of its voluntary nature could
undermine its conflict-reducing nature. At
present, negotiations take place in the shadow of
the qualified majority voting prescribed by the
Treaty for the annual procedure. The Financial
Perspective is not renewed automatically and its
existence hinges on the ability of Member States
and subsequently of the Commission and the
European Parliament to agree on a new multi-
annual budget plan (although the
Interinstitutional Agreement stipulates that the
ceilings of the old Financial Perspective
continue to apply until a new one is adopted, the
Council and the European Parliament can veto
such automatic continuation). If the Financial
Perspective were to be institutionalised and such
a veto did not exist, the tendency for negotiations
over a new Financial Perspective to confirm the
existing spending structure  might increase
further. Budgetary actors could simply prevent
change by relying on the automatic prolongation
of the status quo. Also, the threat to exit the
Financial Perspective (and the Interinstitutional
Agreement) or to veto its renewal has so far
served as a healthy warning to all actors
involved, thereby forcing them to cooperate.
A third set of proposals on the Financial
Perspective relates to its adoption in the
Council of Ministers instead of the European
Council. This proposal is included in the EU
Constitution, with the possibility, however,
that the Council of Ministers could meet at the
level of Heads of State or Government. The
adoption by the Budget Council would indeed
bring the multi-annual budget plan more in line
with the annual budgetary procedure and would
place it on the same level as other EU policy
areas.
Having said this, the involvement of the
European Council ensures that differences
between the spending ministers are
transcended. The Budget Council may not be
powerful enough to free itself from the grip of
the spending Councils (the influential role of
the Agriculture Council is often cited in this
respect). Moreover, Heads of State or
Government in the European Council are able
to broker an agreement on the Financial
Perspective by linking financial negotiations
with non-budgetary issues, as has so far been
the case every time the Financial Perspective
has been renewed.
A fourth set of proposals on the Financial
Perspective relates to synchronising the time-
frame with the term of office of the European
Parliament, as has been proposed by the
European Parliament. This would shorten the
time frame from seven to five years and thus
(slightly) reduce the high degree of pre-
commitment that the current seven-year cycle
entails. Moreover, synchronising the Financial
Perspective with the European Parliament
elections would politicise the multi-annual
budget plan. MEPs could put their budgetary
ideas before the electorate and thus gain
strength vis-à-vis the Council. European voters
would become more aware of the EU budget
and may exercise pressure for a more effective
use of EU funds. There are thus clear arguments
in terms of legitimacy and checks and balances
in favour of this proposal.
That said, a shorter time frame would be likely
to increase the number of budgetary
negotiations, thus reducing the degree of
efficiency of the procedure. Indeed, a
politicisation would only be feasible if the
European Parliament were fully involved in the
negotiations on the Financial Perspective. As
long as the ceilings of the Financial
Perspective are set by Member States in the
European Council and the European Parliament19
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is presented with a take-it-or-leave-it choice at
the end of the negotiations, voters will not see
the relevance of European elections for the
setting-up of the Financial Perspective.
The last proposal on the Financial Perspective
relates to increasing the flexibility of the
expenditure headings, as proposed by the
European Parliament and the Sapir report. The
ceilings imposed on specific expenditure
headings under the current Financial
Perspective may indeed be regarded as
questionable. By setting rigid limits on
expenditure for specific purposes for a rather
long period of time, a potentially useful degree
of flexibility is lost. It appears that the
preference for detailed bargaining at the multi-
annual or annual level may be driven by the
voting mechanism through which the multi-
annual framework and annual budgets are
approved. In the current situation the
unanimity requirement renders agreement on
the Financial Perspective particularly difficult
and the costs in terms of lost flexibility may not
outweigh the benefits in terms of predictability
and stability over a relatively long period of
time. However, if voting requirements for
approval of the Financial Perspective and the
annual budgets were to be relaxed, the benefits
of greater flexibility than is currently the case
could perhaps be reaped without running the
risk of a protracted stalemate.
However, loosening the headings and
facilitating regular revisions may turn the
Financial Perspective into a mere “financial
planning” exercise, largely re-shifting the
decision-making on budgetary matters back to
the annual budgetary procedure and thereby
reducing the efficiency of the procedure. In
consequence, the high levels of conflict that
dominated the 1970s and 1980s may creep back
into budgetary decision-making, thereby
seriously threatening the timely adoption of
annual budgets. Moreover, with its flexibility
and emergency reserves the Financial
Perspective already provides buffers to allow
for unexpected developments.
Theoretical approaches support this point. As
mentioned above, voter utility increases in a
two-stage system based on separate allocations
of responsibilities for the size of the budget and
its composition (Persson, Roland and Tabellini
1997). Increasing the flexibility of the
Financial Perspective (which is de facto set by
the European Council) may run the risk of
creating a “common pool” bargaining
environment, leading to increased rent-seeking
activity by office-holders and a decrease in
utility for voters.
PROPOSALS FOR REFORM AT THE LEVEL OF THE
ANNUAL PROCEDURE
The annual budgetary procedure for the EU
budget, set out in detail in Article 272 of the
Treaty, appears to conform to the division of
labour between an executive branch that
proposes the budget and a legislative branch
that adopts it (see Figure 2). The Commission
prepares a “preliminary draft budget” (PDB),
which is amended by the Council; this version
of the budget, which at this stage of the
procedure is called the “draft budget” (DB), is
forwarded to the European Parliament for
proposals for amendments or modifications.
Following two readings by each of the two
institutions, the European Parliament adopts
the final budget. However, the role of the
Commission is much more limited than this
division of labour suggests. Although the
Commission is present at all stages of the
budgetary process, its main function is over
once the preliminary draft budget is submitted.
The Treaty bestows each of the two arms of the
EU budgetary authority, i.e. the European
Parliament and the Council, with specific
powers which largely rest on a distinction
between compulsory expenditure (that results
directly from Treaty application or from
acts adopted on the basis of the Treaty) and
non-compulsory expenditure. Compulsory
expenditure accounts for around 45% of the EU
budget and is mainly used for the CAP. While20
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11 The Treaty provides for a maximum rate of increase as a limit
on non-compulsory expenditure. Under the Interinstitutional
Agreement, the ceilings of the Financial Perspective replace
the maximum rate of increase.
the European Parliament can – within the limits
set by the Financial Perspective11 – overrule the
Council’s amendments on non-compulsory
expenditure, it has to accept the Council’s
prerogative in the domain of compulsory
expenditure. Moreover, the European
Parliament has the exclusive power to reject the
overall budget.
For years, the distinction between compulsory
and non-compulsory expenditure has been a
bone of contention between the European
Parliament and the Council (Lindner and
Rittberger 2003). It was introduced in 1970 in
order to limit the budgetary powers of the
European Parliament and to ensure the
exclusive control of Member States in the
Council over legislative decisions with
financial implications. With that distinction,
the Council was able to continue its practice of
introducing legally binding entitlements. As
the definition of compulsory expenditure in the
Treaty left scope for interpretation, the
European Parliament and Council fought
intense battles over the classification of certain
expenditure lines.
Since the introduction of the Financial
Perspective and the extension of the European
Parliament’s legislative powers, the distinction
has gradually lost relevance. Close cooperation
and a series of formal and informal meetings
during the course of the annual procedure give
the two arms of the budgetary authority the
opportunity to confer over both types of
expenditure. Often a compromise is found at
Figure 2 The current budgetary procedure (Article 272 of the Treaty)
Source: Enderlein/Lindner (2005).21
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12 Most notably the 1921 Budget and Accounting Act, by which
the President gained a formal role in the federal budget prior
to Congress action, and the 1964 Congressional Budget and
Impounding Control Act, which provided for Congress to
adopt an annual budget resolution setting revenues and
spending and also established the Congressional Budget
Office.
the conciliation meeting shortly before the
second reading in the Council, which is then
endorsed by both institutions in their
respective readings.
As mentioned above, in the United States the
President, as the executive, plays a much
stronger role, and the main dividing line in the
budgetary process runs between the President
and the two chambers of Congress – the Senate
and the House of Representatives.
Unsurprisingly, the current annual budgetary
process of the US federal budget has been
shaped by a number of swings in the relative
strengths of the Presidency and the Congress
which have resulted in a rather complex
budgetary procedure.12 The first step in the US
federal budgetary cycle involves the
submission by the President of the budget for
the following fiscal year. Once the President’s
budget has reached the legislature, Congress
passes its own “budget resolution”, which
provides a framework within which the
different congressional committees will work
and includes targets for total spending and
revenues.
Once Congress has passed its budget
resolution, it turns its attention to passing the
legal instruments which will, subject to the
signature of the President (who retains the
power of veto), allow the disbursement of
funds. The procedure for such approval
depends on the type of expenditure in question.
Formally, the US federal budget contains two
types of spending categories – discretionary
and mandatory – which have some resemblance
to the distinction between compulsory and non-
compulsory expenditure in the EU budgetary
procedure. Discretionary spending for the
following fiscal year is decided on an annual
basis by the President and Congress.
Discretionary spending, which currently
accounts for around a third of all federal
outlays, covers items such as agency budgets,
defence programmes, education, foreign aid,
etc.
Mandatory spending, which accounts for two-
thirds of all spending, is authorised by
permanent laws. It includes entitlements, such
as social security, through which individuals
receive benefits because they are eligible on
the basis of certain criteria. It also includes
interest on the national debt, which the
Government pays to individuals and
institutions that hold Treasury bonds and other
government securities. The President and
Congress can change the law in order to change
the spending on entitlements and other
mandatory programmes – but they do not have
to. For discretionary programmes, Congress
and the President must act each year to provide
spending authority. For mandatory
programmes, they may act in order to change
the spending that current laws require.
On an annual basis, Congress prepares thirteen
bills to appropriate funds for discretionary
expenditure and, if it so chooses, modifies or
enacts new authorising bills governing
mandatory spending and revenues. In each
case, for any authorisation or appropriation to
be enacted, ratification by the President is
required. If the President vetoes a bill, it will be
returned to Congress where a two-thirds vote
by a quorum of members in each chamber is
necessary to override the veto of the executive
branch.
Conflict between the President and Congress
can be pervasive from the moment the
President’s budget reaches the Congress in
February up until the beginning of the fiscal year
in October. The very nature and the high profile
of the budget resolution makes it prone to
conflict between the President and Congress.
Congress can pass any resolution but ultimately
must gain the President’s approval to enact its
proposals. As a result, since 1974 the process22
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and timing of the congressional budget
resolution has been widely different depending
on the year. The veto power enjoyed by the
President is over entire bills. In other words, the
President cannot pick and choose from among
the provisions of a particular act. Congress can
also combine several appropriation bills with
other legislation into one single omnibus
measure, thus forcing the President to sign it or
veto it as a whole. This tactic can put significant
pressure on the President, particularly if, as it is
sometimes the case, spending bills are presented
after the new fiscal year has already started and a
presidential veto would risk shutting down the
Government. Partial shut-downs of federal
government have in fact occurred in the not too
distant past (e.g. 1981, 1984, 1986, 1990 and
1995).
Conflicts between the executive and legislative
branches are aggravated by pork-barrel
spending, in particular earmarking, contained
in bills forwarded by Congress to the President.
By incorporating earmarks into the 13 annual
spending bills that it passes each year,
Congress specifies in law how a certain amount
of money be spent, rather than giving the
executive branch discretion. In so doing,
provided the President signs the respective bill,
Congress manages to keep a tight grip on an
important element of government expenditure.
Overall, both annual budgetary procedures
display a high degree of complexity which
stems from the involvement of a wide range of
institutions and actors representing different
constituencies. In tune with the political
system of the United States, the US budgetary
procedure seeks to strike a balance between the
powers of the directly elected President, who
heads the executive branch, and the role of
Congress, the legislative branch, which
represents the interests of voters in the districts
and states. In the EU the largely supranational
annual budgetary procedure involves delegates
of national governments in the Council and
directly elected MEPs. The Commission, as a
representative of the executive branch, is a
bureaucratic actor that plays a limited role in
the final stages of the procedure. The ceilings
of the Financial Perspective provide a largely
intergovernmental framework around the
annual procedure that limits the conflict
between the different actors.
A number of proposals for reform have been
made with regard to the annual budgetary
procedure in the EU.
One set of proposals relates to eliminating the
distinction between compulsory and non-
compulsory expenditure  (proposals made by
the European Parliament and the Convention’s
discussion circle). Such reform would address
one of the complexities of the annual budgetary
procedure and would acknowledge not only
that there is no real difference in nature
between the two types of expenditure, but also
that in practice the European Parliament and
the Council have developed a system of close
cooperation which has significantly reduced
the relevance of the distinction. Moreover, the
rationale that originally lay behind the
distinction, namely to accommodate the
asymmetry in the distribution of budgetary and
legislative powers between the Council and the
European Parliament, has largely ceased to
apply, as the European Parliament has become
an important co-legislator.
However, it should be kept in mind that
abolishing the distinction is closely linked to
the question of whether one of the two arms of
the budgetary authority should dominate the
annual procedure. At the moment, the
distinction serves as an instrument for dividing
the power to adopt the annual budget equally
between the European Parliament and the
Council. Should non-compulsory expenditure
become the single, all-encompassing
expenditure classification, the European
Parliament would be able to reject the
Council’s amendments and would thus gain the
last word on the annual budget.
A second set of proposals for reform relates to
giving either the Council or the European
Parliament the last word on the annual budget23
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13 As MEPs campaign on European platforms and are directly
elected to decide on European issues, it may be argued that
their democratic legitimacy is stronger than that of national
governments, which are chosen (in most Member States) by
national parliamentarians who are elected largely on the basis
of national issues.
14 This section is based on Laffan/Lindner (2005).
(proposals made by the European Parliament,
the Convention’s discussion circle and the
Constitution – all three proposals favour giving
the last word to the European Parliament).
The current system with two arms of the
budgetary authority having two readings of the
annual budget could indeed be streamlined by
reducing the number of readings to one and
giving one of the two branches of the budgetary
authority the last word on the annual budget.
Such a reform would help increase the
efficiency of the annual budgetary procedure,
in particular as the Council’s first readings
seem to serve mainly presentational purposes.
Moreover, the reform might also increase the
coherence of annual budgets, as one arm of the
budgetary authority would assume
responsibility for the budgets as a whole and
would be freed from finding detailed
compromises with the other institution. For
reasons of democracy,13 the European
Parliament would seem to be more suited than
the Council to take over this position, in
particular as the European Parliament already
has the right to reject the overall budget.
However, it is important to bear in mind that,
taking into account legitimacy concerns, the
current balance between the Council and the
European Parliament helps to ensure the
acceptance of annual budgets among MEPs, as
well as among Member States, whose
contributions form the EU budget. Therefore,
proposals to grant the European Parliament (or
the Council) the last word over the annual
budget may need to be embedded in a structure
of close cooperation, building on the existing
channels between the European Parliament and
the Council. In particular, the conciliation
committee should play a prominent role,
thereby ensuring that the position of the
Council (or the European Parliament) is duly
taken into account.
The theoretical literature on efficiency and
legitimacy provides no clear answers to the
question of the final decision-taking authority
in the annual budgetary procedure. The specific
set-up of the EU institutions makes it difficult
to attribute the traditional roles of “executive”
and “legislature” to the various players
involved in the annual budgetary procedure. It
is clear, however, that a joint decision mode,
bringing together two or more actors in the
budgetary procedure, would face the “common
pool problem”. In this context, a two-stage
approach with either the European Parliament
or the Council taking the final decision on the
annual budgetary procedure would appear
theoretically more desirable. This point also
derives from the efficiency literature, which
clearly favours a streamlined process with a
clear allocation of power resources.
4 THE STATE OF PLAY FOLLOWING THE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE14
Against the background of these different
proposals and on the basis of the draft
Constitution of the Convention, representatives
at the IGC negotiated on the possible
institutional reforms in the budgetary field. The
European Constitution, which was finally
adopted by Heads of State or Government in
June 2004 and formally signed in Rome on
29 October 2004, introduces a budgetary
procedure that remains de facto close to the
current budgetary decision-making process –
even though de jure the two procedures may
appear very different. In fact, the main
innovations that the “new” budgetary procedure
entails are taken from the rules and procedures
that are currently laid down in the
Interinstitutional Agreement. Thus, it simply
institutionalises existing informal arrangements
and does not enact institutional change.
For the annual procedure, three innovations are
introduced (see Figure 3): (i) the abolition of the24
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distinction between compulsory and non-
compulsory expenditure, (ii) the introduction of
a Conciliation Committee into the Constitution,
and (iii) the granting of the right of rejection to
the Council. All three correspond closely to
current practice. In the first case, over time the
distinction between the compulsory and non-
compulsory expenditure has lost its relevance.
The Interinstitutional Agreement already gives
the European Parliament some say over
compulsory expenditure through the ad hoc
conciliation procedure. Second, the equivalent
to a Conciliation Committee is already in place.
Most of the time, the annual budget is de facto
adopted in a conciliation meeting between the
Council and the European Parliament shortly
before the second reading in Council. Third,
given that negotiations at the conciliation
meeting cover all areas of the budget, the
exclusive budgetary powers over the non-
compulsory expenditure for the European
Parliament and over the compulsory expenditure
for the Council have de facto amounted to a right
of rejection for both arms of the budgetary
authority. Both the Council and the European
Parliament use their budgetary powers as
bargaining chips to strike deals over the different
parts of the budget. Under the new procedure, the
Council will be able to prevent an agreement in
the Conciliation Committee and thus trigger a
new budget proposal by the Commission. The
granting of the right of rejection to the Council
simply maintains the current balance.
With regard to the Financial Perspective, the
new provisions largely institutionalise the
current procedures for the multi-annual budget
plan. From the outset, it was clear that the
institutionalisation of the Financial
Perspective would probably be a minimum
result of the constitutional negotiations. Given
the objectives of the constitutional process (i.e.
to update and streamline the Treaty), the
contrast between the Treaty provisions and
current practice was simply too pronounced in
this area of budgetary decision-making for the
drafters of the Constitution to ignore it.
However, any attempts to go beyond
institutionalising the current Interinstitutional
Agreement were strongly opposed. Although
the Convention settled on the introduction of
qualified majority voting for the Financial
Perspective after 2013, the Heads of State or
Government adopted a provision that allows
for the introduction of qualified majority
voting only on the basis of a unanimous
decision by the European Council. Similarly,
the Constitution’s provisions concerning the
revenue side do not alter the unanimity
requirement for own-resources decisions.
Overall, the IGC settled on reforming the
current budgetary procedure only to the extent
that proven rules and procedures from outside
the Treaty are brought into the Constitution.
Taking into account the close link between the
overall state of integration in the EU and
procedural issues related to budgetary matters,
it is not surprising that constitutional
negotiators were risk-averse with regard to
changes to the budgetary procedures that would
have entailed significant consequences for the
general set-up of the EU.
5 CONCLUSION
This paper has discussed the question
why, despite widespread calls for reforms of
the EU budgetary procedure, the European
Convention and, even more importantly, the
Intergovernmental Conference seem to have
generated only minor institutional adjustments
in the area of the EU budgetary procedure.
The analysis of the EU budgetary procedure
and various reform proposals reveals that the
current institutional design corresponds by-
and-large to an equilibrium between all the
actors involved. Altering that equilibrium
would require a shift in the level of integration.
The “embeddedness” of the budgetary field in
the overall state of European integration thus
constrains the scope of reform. Given that
neither the European Convention nor the IGC
focused on questions related to the general
state of political integration, it is not surprising
that the calls for far-reaching reforms of the EU26
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budgetary procedure did not result in the
desired institutional change.
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to
consider the pros and cons of changes in the
state of political integration, a number of
elements are crucial in demarcating the room
for manoeuvre for the EU budgetary procedure.
Such key elements, which we call dimensions
of political integration, are (i) the assignment
of tasks to the different levels of government,
(ii) the balance of power between the various
EU actors and the corresponding voting
modalities, and (iii) the degree to which
citizens identify themselves with the EU and
with the politicians who are supposed to
represent them at that level.
These conclusions should not be read as a
panglossian view of current EU budgetary
procedures but rather as a cautionary tale about
the limited impact that may be expected from a
simplification of budgetary procedures that
leaves unaltered the broader EU institutional
and political set-up. To fundamentally change
current EU budgetary outcomes would require
the modification of the current set of broader
constraints in which any EU budgetary
procedure is necessarily embedded.27
ECB
Occasional Paper No. 27
April 2005
REFERENCES
Alesina, A. and E. Spolaore (1997): “On the Number and Size of Nations”, Quarterly Journal of
Economics, Vol. 107, no. 4, November, pp. 1027-1056.
Begg, I. (1999): “Reshaping the EU budget: Yet another missed opportunity?”, South Bank
European Paper 5/99, South Bank University.
Begg, I. and N. Grimwade (1998): Paying for Europe, Sheffield Academic Press, Sheffield. 
Buchanan, J.M. and G. Tullock (1962): The Calculus of Consent, Ann Arbor, University of
Michigan Press. 
Congressional Budget Office (2003): The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2004-
2013, US Government Printing Office, January (available at http://www.cbo.gov/
ftpdoc.cfm?index=4032&type=1).
Enderlein, H. and J. Lindner (2005): “The EU Budgetary Procedure in the Constitutional Debate”,
J. Richardson (ed.): European Union: Power & Policy-Making, 3rd edition, London:
Routledge.
European Commission (2002): European Union Public Finance, Office for Official Publications
of the European Communities, Luxembourg.
European Commission (2004): European Union. Financial Report 2003, Office for Official
Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg (available at http://europa.eu.int/
comm/budget/pdf/execution/execution/financialreport03/rapfin_en.pdf).
European Convention (2003a): Final report of the discussion circle on the budgetary procedure,
CONV 679/03, 14 April.
European Convention (2003b): Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, CONV 820/
1/03 REV 1, CONV 847/03, CONV 848/03, 18 July.
European Parliament (2003): Report on the reform of the budgetary procedure: possible options
in view of the revision of the treaties, A5-0046/2003, 20 February.
Folkers, C. (1997): “Finanz- und Haushaltspolitik”, in P. Klemmer (ed.): Handbuch der
Europäischen Wirtschaftspolitik, Verlag Franz Vahlen, Munich, pp. 561-663.
Goulard, S. and M. Nava (2002): “Un financement plus démocratique du budget européen: un défi
pour la Convention européenne”, Revue Française de Finances Publiques, 80, pp. 31-52. 
Hallerberg, M. and J. von Hagen (1999): “Electoral Institutions, Cabinet Negotiations, and
Budget Deficits within the European Union”, in Poterba, J. and J. von Hagen (eds.): Fiscal
Institutions and Fiscal Performance, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp. 209-232.
Laffan, B. (1997): The Finances of the European Union, Macmillan Press, Basingstoke. 28
ECB
Occasional Paper No. 27
April 2005
Laffan, B. and J. Lindner (2005): “The EU budget”, in Pollack, M. A. Wallace, and H. Wallace
(eds.): Policy-Making in the European Union, 5th edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Läufer, T. (1990): Die Organe der EG – Rechtsetzung und Haushaltsverfahren zwischen
Kooperation und Konflikt, Europa Union Verlag, Bonn.
Leonardi, R. (1999): The Socio-economic Impact of Projects Financed by the Cohesion Fund: A
Modelling Approach, 3 volumes, Office of Official Publications of the European
Communities, Luxembourg. 
Lindner, J. (2003): “Institutional stability and change: two sides of the same coin”, Journal of
European Public Policy, 10,6, pp. 912-935.
Lindner, J. (2005): Conflict and Change in EU Budgetary Politics, London: Routledge.
Lindner, J. and B. Rittberger (2003): “The Creation, Interpretation and Contestation of
Institutions – Revisiting Historical Institutionalism”, Journal of Common Market Studies,
41, 3, pp. 445-473.
Marx, G. and L. Hooghe (2003): National Identity and European Integration. A Multi-Level
Analysis of Public Opinion, Unpublished paper (available at http://www.unc.edu/~hooghe/
downloads/national_identity_25march2003.pdf).
Monar, J. (1994): “Interinstitutional Agreements: The Phenomenon and its new Dynamics after
Maastricht”, Common Market Law Review, 31, pp. 693-719.
Nava, M. (2000): La finanza europea, Stocia aualisi e perspettive della politica fiscale europea,
Carocci, Rome.
Oates, W.E. (1999): “An Essay on Fiscal Federalism”, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol.
XXXVII, September, pp. 1120–1149.
Office of Management and Budget, Executive Office of the President of the United States (2003):
“Budget System and Concepts and Glossary”, Fiscal Year 2004 (available at http://
w3.access.gpo.gov/usbudget/fy2004/pdf/concepts.pdf).
Padoa-Schioppa, T. (2002): “A European Economic Constitution”, The Federalist – A Political
Review, XLIV, 3, pp. 190-202. 
Persson, J., G. Roland and G. Tabellini (1997): “Separation of Powers and Political
Accountability”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, November. 
Persson, J., G. Roland and G. Tabellini (2000): “Comparative Politicsand Public Finance”,
Journal of Political Economy, 108.
Persson, J. and G. Tabellini (2003): The Economic Effects of Constitutions, MIT Press, Boston.
Pollack, M.A. (2003): The Engine of European Integration – Delegation, Agency, and Agenda
Setting in the EU, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 29
ECB
Occasional Paper No. 27
April 2005
 5 CONCLUSION
Sapir, A. et al. (2003): An Agenda for a Growing Europe. Making the EU Economic System
Deliver, July 2003 (available at http://www.euractiv.com/ndbtext/innovation/
sapirreport.pdf). Also forthcoming with Oxford University Press.
Scharpf, F.W. (1988): “The joint-decision trap: Lessons from German federalism and European
integration”, Public Administration, Vol. 66, Autumn, pp. 239-278.
Scharpf, F.W. (1999): Governing Europe. Effective and Democratic?, Oxford University Press,
Oxford.
Schick, A. (2000): The Federal Budget: Politics, Policy, and Process, Brookings Institution,
Washington.
Shackleton, M. (1990): Financing the European Community, The Royal Institute of International
Affairs, Pinter Publishers, London.
Strauss-Kahn, D. et al. (2004): Construire l’Europe Politique – 50 Propositions pour l’Europe de
Demain, April (available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/policy_advisersexperts_groups/
gsk_docs/rapport_europe_strauss_kahn_fr.pdf).
Tabellini, G. (2002): “Principles of Policymaking in the European Union: an Economic
Perspective”, Paper presented at the Munich Economic Summit, June.
von Hagen, J. (1992): “Budgeting procedures and fiscal performance in the EC”, European
Commission, Directorate for Economic and Financial Affairs, Economic Paper, 96.
von Hagen, J. and I. J. Harden (1994): “National budget processes and fiscal performance”,
European Economy Reports and Studies, 3, pp. 315-418.
Wallis, J. J. (2000): “American Government Finance in the Long Run: 1790 to 1990”, Journal of
Economic Perspectives, 14, 1, pp. 61-82.30
ECB




1 “The impact of the euro on money and bond markets” by J. Santillán, M. Bayle and
C. Thygesen, July 2000.
2 “The effective exchange rates of the euro” by L. Buldorini, S. Makrydakis and C. Thimann,
February 2002.
3 “Estimating the trend of M3 income velocity underlying the reference value for monetary
growth” by C. Brand, D. Gerdesmeier and B. Roffia, May 2002.
4 “Labour force developments in the euro area since the 1980s” by V. Genre and
R. Gómez-Salvador, July 2002.
5 “The evolution of clearing and central counterparty services for exchange-traded
derivatives in the United States and Europe: a comparison” by D. Russo,
T. L. Hart and A. Schönenberger, September 2002.
6 “Banking integration in the euro area” by I. Cabral, F. Dierick and J. Vesala,
December 2002.
7 “Economic relations with regions neighbouring the euro area in the ‘Euro Time Zone’” by
F. Mazzaferro, A. Mehl, M. Sturm, C. Thimann and A. Winkler, December 2002.
8 “An introduction to the ECB’s survey of professional forecasters” by J. A. Garcia,
September 2003.
9 “Fiscal adjustment in 1991-2002: stylised facts and policy implications” by M. G. Briotti,
February 2004.
10 “The acceding countries’ strategies towards ERM II and the adoption of the euro:
an analytical review” by a staff team led by P. Backé and C. Thimann and including
O. Arratibel, O. Calvo-Gonzalez, A. Mehl and C. Nerlich, February 2004.
11 “Official dollarisation/euroisation: motives, features and policy implications of current
cases” by A. Winkler, F. Mazzaferro, C. Nerlich and C. Thimann, February 2004.
12 “Understanding the impact of the external dimension on the euro area: trade, capital flows and
other international macroeconomic linkages“ by R. Anderton, F. di Mauro and F. Moneta,
March 2004.
13 “Fair value accounting and financial stability” by a staff team led by A. Enria and including
L. Cappiello, F. Dierick, S. Grittini, A. Maddaloni, P. Molitor, F. Pires and P. Poloni,
April 2004.
14 “Measuring Financial Integration in the Euro Area” by L. Baele, A. Ferrando, P. Hördahl,
E. Krylova, C. Monnet, April 2004.31
ECB
Occasional Paper No. 27
April 2005
15 “Quality adjustment of European price statistics and the role for hedonics” by H. Ahnert and
G. Kenny, May 2004.
16 “Market dynamics associated with credit ratings: a literature review” by F. Gonzalez, F. Haas,
R. Johannes, M. Persson, L. Toledo, R. Violi, M. Wieland and C. Zins, June 2004.
17 “Corporate ‘Excesses’ and financial market dynamics” by A. Maddaloni and D. Pain, July 2004.
18 “The international role of the euro: evidence from bonds issued by non-euro area residents” by
A. Geis, A. Mehl and S. Wredenborg, July 2004.
19 “Sectoral specialisation in the EU a macroeconomic perspective” by MPC task force of the
ESCB, July 2004.
20 “The supervision of mixed financial services groups in Europe” by F. Dierick, August 2004.
21 “Governance of securities clearing and settlement systems” by D. Russo, T. Hart,
M. C. Malaguti and C. Papathanassiou, October 2004.
22 “Assessing potential output growth in the euro area: a growth accounting perspective”
by A. Musso and T. Westermann, January 2005.
23 “The bank lending survey for the euro area” by J. Berg, A. van Rixtel, A. Ferrando,
G. de Bondt and S. Scopel, February 2005.
24 “Wage diversity in the euro area: an overview of labour cost differentials across
industries” by V. Genre, D. Momferatou and G. Mourre, February 2005.
25 “Government debt management in the euro area: recent theoretical developments and changes
in practices” by G. Wolswijk and J. de Haan, March 2005.
26 “The analysis of banking sector health using macro-prudential indicators” by L. Mörttinen,
P. Poloni, P. Sandars and J. Vesala, March 2005.
27 “The EU budget – how much scope for institutional reform?” by H. Enderlein, J. Lindner,
O. Calvo-Gonzalez and R. Ritter, March 2005.